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From: Greg KH on 19 Feb 2010 12:20
2.6.32-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
commit 51246bfd189064079c54421507236fd2723b18f3 upstream.
If the owner of a PI futex dies we fix up the pi_state and set
pi_state->owner to NULL. When a malicious or just sloppy programmed
user space application sets the futex value to 0 e.g. by calling
pthread_mutex_init(), then the futex can be acquired again. A new
waiter manages to enqueue itself on the pi_state w/o damage, but on
unlock the kernel dereferences pi_state->owner and oopses.
Prevent this by checking pi_state->owner in the unlock path. If
pi_state->owner is not current we know that user space manipulated the
futex value. Ignore the mess and return -EINVAL.
This catches the above case and also the case where a task hijacks the
futex by setting the tid value and then tries to unlock it.
Reported-by: Jermome Marchand <jmarchan(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc(a)us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra(a)chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)suse.de>
kernel/futex.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
@@ -758,6 +758,13 @@ static int wake_futex_pi(u32 __user *uad
+ * If current does not own the pi_state then the futex is
+ * inconsistent and user space fiddled with the futex value.
+ if (pi_state->owner != current)
+ return -EINVAL;
new_owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
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