From: Marina Gotovchits on
On 28 Okt, 12:19, Marina Gotovchits <renessa...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
> On 28 Okt, 12:09, Marina Gotovchits <renessa...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Let O-PA be Peano Arithmetic extended with the omega.rule. As is well
> > known, O-PA is complete, and for any aithmetically true sentence A, O-
> > PA "proves" A. (Or so we think, unless we suffer from certain highly
> > finitist, or ultra-predicativist, qualms, e.g. à la Leonard Nelson.)
>
> Sorry, I meant Edward Nelson, of course.

From: Marina Gotovchits on
On 29 Okt, 21:40, Rupert <rupertmccal...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Oct 29, 7:19 pm, Marina Gotovchits <renessa...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 29 Okt, 05:34, Rupert <rupertmccal...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Oct 28, 10:09 pm, Marina Gotovchits <renessa...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > Let O-PA be Peano Arithmetic extended with the omega.rule. As is well
> > > > known, O-PA is complete, and for any aithmetically true sentence A, O-
> > > > PA "proves" A. (Or so we think, unless we suffer from certain highly
> > > > finitist, or ultra-predicativist, qualms, e.g. à la Leonard Nelson.)
>
> > > > Suppose ZF is consistent. It then seems that an arithmetical sentence
> > > > to the effect CON(ZF) is true. So CON(ZF) should hold in O-PA.
>
> > > > Now, does this not mean that if ZF is consistent then there is a non-
> > > > standard model of ZF in O-PA?
>
> > > I don't understand this. How can you do model theory in the first-
> > > order language of arithmetic?
>
> > Is your problem that the theory is first-order? I should think not. By
> > the Skolem-Löwenhem Theorem, if ZF has a model, it has a countable
> > model. Now CON(ZF) should be ezpressible in arithmetic. Hence the
> > question.
>
> > > > If right, how is the situation with regard to the 1-consistency of
> > > > certain extensions of ZF. Let e.g. G be the theory ZFC + LCA, where
> > > > LCA is some large cardinal axiom. If G is 1-consistent, it again seems
> > > > that this can be expressed in an arithmetical sentence 1-CON(G), and
> > > > since true, 1-CON(G) will hold in O-PA. Does this mean that there is a
> > > > non-standard 1-consistent model of G in O-PA?- Hide quoted text -
>
> > - Show quoted text -
>
> Con(ZF) is an arithmetical sentence, yes. What you are calling O-PA is
> basically true arithmetic, the set of arithmetical sentences which are
> true in the standard model. And this will include Con(ZF) on the
> assumption that ZF is consistent.
>
> But I don't understand what it means to say "there is a nonstandard
> model of ZF in O-PA". That seems to mean something like "O-PA proves
> that there is a nonstandard model of ZF", but the problem is that I
> cannot talk about arbitrary countable models of ZF in the first-order
> language of arithmetic. I can do so in the second-order language of
> arithmetic.

Thanks Rupert,

I have, after having posed the question, come to see that it was ill
posed. These matters of couse all depend upon what we mean by a
"model". But it seems, and I believe uncontroverially, that this
should mean something like "there is a pair <V,e> so that V contain
the "sets" in the theory and e is a sub"set" of V2 so that ......
blah, blah". So I agree that we need to move somewhat upwards in the
hierarcy of subsystems of second-order arithmetic to have such a
countable model for ZF. My question should have been posed as
folllows, perhaps: If we have the omega-rula along the climb up the
hierarchy of subsystems os SOA, how far do we need to go in order to
have a model of ZF if ZF is consistent? Perhaps only ACA(0)? ATR(0)?
PI-1-1? Higher?

I don't see any need for talking about "arbitrary" countable models of
ZF here.
From: Aatu Koskensilta on
Marina Gotovchits <renessanse(a)gmail.com> writes:

> My question should have been posed as folllows, perhaps: If we have
> the omega-rula along the climb up the hierarchy of subsystems os SOA,
> how far do we need to go in order to have a model of ZF if ZF is
> consistent?

WKL-0 proves the completeness theorem, and thus in particular that if ZF
is consistent it has a model.

--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensilta(a)uta.fi)

"Wovon mann nicht sprechen kann, dar�ber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
From: Marina Gotovchits on
On 30 Okt, 00:28, Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote:
> Marina Gotovchits <renessa...(a)gmail.com> writes:
> > My question should have been posed as folllows, perhaps: If we have
> > the omega-rula along the climb up the hierarchy of subsystems os SOA,
> > how far do we need to go in order to have a model of ZF if ZF is
> > consistent?
>
> WKL-0 proves the completeness theorem, and thus in particular that if ZF
> is consistent it has a model.

Aha! Thank you very much Aatu!! I recall Simpson's Theorem I.10.3.8
(page 36 of his Book), which states that WKL(0) is equivalent, over RCA
(0), to "Gödel's completeness theorem: every (consistent) finite, or
countable, set of sentences in the predicate calculus has a countable
model.

Does this mean that if ZF is consistent, then a countable model "lives
in" WKL(0)+the omega rule. Or do we need to go slightly higher for the
model to be representable by a "set" in a subsystem of SOA. I ask this
because Gödel's completeness theorem here may be interpreted
existentially relative to WKL(0). I.e.. GCT and WKL(0) are equivalent,
over RCA(0), so maybe WKL(0)+ the omega rule only asserts that there
IS a countable model of ZF (if ZF is consistent), without itself
exhibiting such a model. If so, when does the model itself become a
"set"?
From: Rupert on
On Oct 30, 9:41 pm, Marina Gotovchits <renessa...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
> On 30 Okt, 00:28, Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote:
>
> > Marina Gotovchits <renessa...(a)gmail.com> writes:
> > > My question should have been posed as folllows, perhaps: If we have
> > > the omega-rula along the climb up the hierarchy of subsystems os SOA,
> > > how far do we need to go in order to have a model of ZF if ZF is
> > > consistent?
>
> > WKL-0 proves the completeness theorem, and thus in particular that if ZF
> > is consistent it has a model.
>
> Aha! Thank you very much Aatu!! I recall Simpson's Theorem I.10.3.8
> (page 36 of his Book), which states that WKL(0) is equivalent, over RCA
> (0), to "Gödel's completeness theorem: every (consistent) finite, or
> countable, set of sentences in the predicate calculus has a countable
> model.
>
> Does this mean that if ZF is consistent, then a countable model "lives
> in" WKL(0)+the omega rule. Or do we need to go slightly higher for the
> model to be representable by a "set" in a subsystem of SOA. I ask this
> because Gödel's completeness theorem here may be interpreted
> existentially relative to WKL(0). I.e.. GCT and WKL(0) are equivalent,
> over RCA(0), so maybe WKL(0)+ the omega rule only asserts that there
> IS a countable model of ZF (if ZF is consistent), without itself
> exhibiting such a model. If so, when does the model itself become a
> "set"?

Assuming that ZF is consistent, in WKL_0+the omega rule we can prove
that there exists a model of ZF. We probably can't prove that the
natural numbers are standard in this model. Was that your question?