From: no.top.post on
Although, learnt at the 8-bit device level, I KNOW computers
down to the transistor level. So I get very annoyed and insulted
by these art-students and journalist's stories.

> http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/351670_picframevirus18.html
>
> While some advise disabling Autorun in Windows, which allows
> devices to run automatically when they're plugged into a USB port,
> it's not a fail-safe. Doing so requires some computer expertise,
> and this Trojan re-enables Autorun if it's turned off, according to
> Brian Grayek of Computer Associates. "If you plug in (the frame),
> you're already infected," he said.
>
> Deborah Hale at SANS suggested that PC users find friends with
> Macintosh or Linux machines and have them check for malware before
> plugging any device into a PC.

OK, while writing this, I've realised that eg. the facility :"boot from
a USB, or any other device" is where the virus could be introduced.

For the PC to 'become infected' it must either:
1. execute some code in the USB-device -> autoboot is disasterous !
2. have the active USB device write to the PC memory, which will
later be executed by the PC. But the PC controls what is written to
its executable RAM/ROM.
Although the USB-device is an active device, which can independantly
'talk' to the PC, the PC will decide if/when to 'listen' and the input from
the USB will be interpreted/treated as data. So the received bytes will
never get a chance to be executed.

Since the operation of the CPU is via:
1. fetch the instruction via the program-counter/pointer current value,
2. execute the fetched instruction,
3. step the program-counter/pointer;
the boot-device must provide the code to be executed ON REQUEST
BY THE PC, to first be cached in RAM. I.e. where steps 1,2,3 can be
performed.

Perhaps modern systems can fake a delivery of a data request
[via the normal adr-bus mechanism] by hardware
diversion/multiplexing and waiting for the byte/s to arrive
from the device other than RAM/ROM, instead of first loading
some bytes to cache. But this seems pointless.

Q what [explained, down to the level like I've done] is the
"auto run" mode of Windows ?

== TIA
From: Maxwell Lol on
no.top.post(a)gmail.com writes:

> OK, while writing this, I've realised that eg. the facility :"boot from
> a USB, or any other device" is where the virus could be introduced.

It's not simply booting. But simply plugging in the USB drive, that
allows the virus to infect a computer.

See ArameFarpodo's post.

I disable auto-run on my computers for all external drives
(network mounted, USB, etc.)

One of the easy ways to hack into a computer facility is to drop
infected USB drives in the parking lot. A lot of people will pick them
up and plug them in to see what's on the drive.
From: Harold Stevens on
In <87bph7e74o.fsf(a)mythtv.grymoire.com> Maxwell Lol:

[Snip...]

> plug them in to see what's on the drive

I've known of secured areas where USB ports were filled with epoxy and an
embedded security tag for exactly this reason. In short: morons abound.

--
Regards, Weird (Harold Stevens) * IMPORTANT EMAIL INFO FOLLOWS *
Pardon any bogus email addresses (wookie) in place for spambots.
Really, it's (wyrd) at airmail, dotted with net. DO NOT SPAM IT.
I toss GoogleGroup (http://twovoyagers.com/improve-usenet.org/).
From: John Hasler on
AZ Nomad writes:
> If you don't have physical security then you have no security at all.
> You're deluding yourself if you think a little epoxy provides any real
> security.

The epoxy is quite enough to prevent the users from sticking their
sticks in. The point is to prevent authorized users from doing stupid
things, not prevent black-bag jobs.

> Pop the cover. Pull the hard drive, and image it. If necessary,
> return with copy on laptop to pull all the data you want from the
> network.

But first get past the armed guards.
--
John Hasler
jhasler(a)newsguy.com
Dancing Horse Hill
Elmwood, WI USA
From: The Natural Philosopher on
John Hasler wrote:
> AZ Nomad writes:
>> If you don't have physical security then you have no security at all.
>> You're deluding yourself if you think a little epoxy provides any real
>> security.
>
> The epoxy is quite enough to prevent the users from sticking their
> sticks in. The point is to prevent authorized users from doing stupid
> things, not prevent black-bag jobs.
>
>> Pop the cover. Pull the hard drive, and image it. If necessary,
>> return with copy on laptop to pull all the data you want from the
>> network.
>
> But first get past the armed guards.
I wish people would realise there is no such thing as 'security'

There is more secure, and there is less secure. there is no 'secure'